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STENGEL, Chief District Judge. 
Christopher Columbus, LLC appeals the District 
Court’s dismissal of its limitation action, brought pursuant to 
the Limitation of Vessel Owner’s Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 
30511. Christopher Columbus filed this action after Appellee 
Michael Bocchino filed a negligence lawsuit against it in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Both of these actions 
arise out of a drunken brawl which erupted among passengers 
who were enjoying a cruise on the Delaware River onboard the 
vessel Ben Franklin Yacht. Following a hearing on the issue of 
subject-matter jurisdiction in the limitation action, the District 
Court found that maritime jurisdiction was lacking and 
dismissed the limitation action. For the reasons that follow, we 
find there is maritime jurisdiction over the dispute, and we will 
therefore vacate the District Court’s dismissal of the limitation 
action.   
I  Background 
 Christopher Columbus owns and operates the passenger 
vessel “Ben Franklin Yacht,” which provides cruise services 
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on the Delaware River.1 The Ben Franklin Yacht, which is over 
eighty feet long and has three passenger decks, departs from 
and docks at Pier 24, located at 401 North Columbus 
Boulevard in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Pier 24 is located just 
north of the Ben Franklin Bridge and is adjacent to the main 
shipping channel of the Delaware River. 
Bocchino was a patron on a cruise on the Ben Franklin 
Yacht on May 3, 2013. Bocchino was apparently “assaulted on 
the vessel and/or in the parking lot near the dock where the Ben 
Franklin Yacht was moored by ‘unknown patrons of the cruise 
and/or agents, servant[s], workmen and/or employees’” of 
Christopher Columbus. App. 47a. Bocchino filed a complaint 
against the Ben Franklin Yacht and others in the Court of 
Common Pleas for Philadelphia County, alleging claims for 
negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault, 
and punitive damages. Christopher Columbus then filed its 
Complaint for Exoneration From or Limitation of Liability in 
federal court (“the limitation action”). Bocchino and three 
additional passengers on the May 3, 2013 cruise asserted 
claims in the limitation action, alleging that (1) while 
passengers for hire on the Ben Franklin Yacht, they were 
assaulted and injured by fellow passengers,2 and (2) the 
vessel’s crewmembers caused these injuries by providing 
                                                 
1 The Ben Franklin Yacht is documented by the United 
States Coast Guard to carry paying passengers on cruises. 
2 Bocchino claimed to have been assaulted while aboard 
the vessel and in the parking lot on the pier, while the other 
three claimants alleged that they were assaulted on the vessel. 
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inadequate security and overserving alcohol to passengers. The 
claimants asserted that the assaults began while they were still 
onboard the vessel and while the vessel was in the process of 
berthing at Pier 24.  
 While cross-motions for summary judgment were 
pending, the District Court sua sponte ordered argument and 
invited briefing on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
After hearing oral argument, the District Court determined that 
the test for maritime jurisdiction had not been met and 
dismissed the limitation action for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, we will reverse. 
II Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. We review de novo a district court’s determination of its 
own admiralty jurisdiction.3 Hargus v. Ferocious & 
                                                 
3 This appeal comes to us in a somewhat unusual posture 
for a determination of admiralty jurisdiction. It is more often 
the case that the question of whether admiralty jurisdiction 
applies to a particular dispute is raised at the outset, and is 
therefore answered on the basis of the allegations in the 
pleadings. See, e.g., Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of 
N.Y. & N.J., 805 F.3d 98, 104 (3d Cir. 2015). At the initial 
stages of litigation in this case, both sides agreed that there was 
subject-matter jurisdiction. It was only later, after the District 
Court had been presented with the parties’ summary judgment 
motions and their competing sets of disputed facts taken from 
a developed evidentiary record, that the District Court 
questioned whether there was admiralty jurisdiction in this 
case. The nature of the “attack” on jurisdiction was, therefore, 
factual rather than facial. See, e.g., Constitution Party of Pa. v. 
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Impetuous, LLC, 840 F.3d 133, 135 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing 
Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 805 F.3d 
98, 104 (3d Cir. 2015) and Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 
599, 601 (3d Cir. 1991)).  
III Discussion 
Christopher Columbus raises three principal arguments 
on appeal, but we address only the first:4 whether the District 
                                                 
Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014) (distinguishing facial 
attacks on jurisdiction from factual attacks). Thus, while the 
issue did not arise in the context of a motion to dismiss, it is 
akin to a factual attack which “is an argument that there is no 
subject matter jurisdiction because the facts of the case—and 
here the District Court may look beyond the pleadings to 
ascertain the facts—do not support the asserted jurisdiction.” 
Id. Accordingly, when assessing our subject-matter 
jurisdiction over Christopher Columbus’s limitation action, we 
rely on the undisputed facts drawn from the summary judgment 
record. See id. (discussing “the standard of review applicable 
to a factual attack, in which a court may weigh and ‘consider 
evidence outside the pleadings.’”) (quoting Gould Elecs. Inc. 
v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000)); see also 
Hartig Drug Co. Inc. v. Senju Pharm. Co., 836 F.3d 261, 268 
(3d Cir. 2016) (explaining that a factual attack on subject-
matter jurisdiction “strips the plaintiff of the protections and 
factual deference provided under 12(b)(6) review.”) (citing 
Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 348–50 (3d Cir. 2016)). 
4 Because we find that the test for admiralty jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) is satisfied, we need not 
address Christopher Columbus’s second and third issues on 
appeal: that the District Court erred in finding that the 
7 
 
Court erred in finding that the alleged incident aboard the Ben 
Franklin Yacht had insufficient potential to disrupt maritime 
commerce, and that therefore admiralty jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) was lacking. Appellee Michael 
Bocchino did not file a cross-appeal, so we do not address his 
contention that the District Court erred in dismissing his 
summary judgment motion as moot.5 
                                                 
Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30101(a), 
did not confer an independent basis for jurisdiction; and that 
the District Court erred in finding that the Limitation of Vessel 
Owner’s Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30501, et seq., did not 
confer an independent basis for jurisdiction.  
5 Bocchino asserts that the entirety of the District 
Court’s Dismissal Order is now before us for review because 
Christopher Columbus did not limit its Notice of Appeal to the 
portion of the Order dismissing the case for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction. He therefore urges us to consider whether 
his motion for summary judgment should have been granted, 
instead of being denied as moot, in light of what he contends 
are undisputed facts showing that he is entitled to summary 
judgment in the limitation action, so that he may then proceed 
in state court with his negligence action. 
We have previously said that “an appellee may, without 
taking a cross-appeal, support the judgment as entered through 
any matter appearing in the record, though his argument may 
attack the lower court’s reasoning or bring forth a matter 
overlooked or ignored by the court.” EF Operating Corp. v. 
Am. Bldgs., 993 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations 
omitted).  
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 Under the United States Constitution, the federal courts 
have the power to hear “all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
Jurisdiction.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Congress codified 
that jurisdiction at 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1), which provides that 
federal district courts have original jurisdiction over “[a]ny 
civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 
1333(1). As noted in our recent decision in Hargus v. 
Ferocious & Impetuous, LLC, “[t]he fundamental interest 
                                                 
Here, Bocchino does not seek to support the District 
Court’s decision to dismiss for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction, or its denial of the summary judgment motions as 
moot, through alternative grounds. Instead, he seeks to have 
his summary judgment motion granted on the merits, so that 
the limitation action can be dismissed and the case can be 
remanded to state court for a jury trial. In other words, he asks 
that, if we reverse the District Court on the issue of subject-
matter jurisdiction, we decide the merits of his summary 
judgment motion in his favor. Seeking this form of relief, in 
light of the procedural history of this case, requires a cross-
appeal. See EF Operating Corp., 993 F.2d at 1048–49 
(reasoning that “[a] grant of summary judgment and a 
dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction . . . are wholly 
different forms of relief. The latter is a dismissal without 
prejudice, whereas the former is a ruling on the merits which if 
affirmed would have preclusive effect” and holding that a 
cross-appeal was required) (citation omitted). Accordingly, 
because Bocchino did not file a cross-appeal, we will not 
consider in the first instance his argument that summary 
judgment should have been entered in his favor, and leave it to 
the District Court to address the merits of that motion on 
remand.  
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giving rise to maritime jurisdiction is ‘the protection of 
maritime commerce.’” 840 F.3d at 136 (quoting Sisson v. 
Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 367 (1990) (citation omitted)).  
With respect to maritime tort claims, the test for 
determining admiralty jurisdiction concerns both the incident’s 
location and its connection with maritime activity: 
When a party seeks to invoke federal admiralty 
jurisdiction over a tort claim, the claim “must 
satisfy conditions both of location and of 
connection with maritime activity.” Jerome B. 
Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock 
Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995)). The location 
aspect is satisfied if “the tort occurred on 
navigable water” or the “injury suffered on land 
was caused by a vessel on navigable water.” Id. 
The connection aspect is a conjunctive two-part 
inquiry.  First, we “must ‘assess the general 
features of the type of incident involved’ to 
determine whether the incident has ‘a potentially 
disruptive impact on maritime commerce.’” Id. 
(quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 363, 364 
n.2 (1990)). Second, we “must determine 
whether ‘the general character’ of the ‘activity 
giving rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial 
relationship to traditional maritime activity.’” Id. 
(quoting Sisson, 497 U.S. at 364 n.2, 365). 
Federal admiralty jurisdiction is only proper 
when the location test and both prongs of the 
connection test are satisfied. Id. 
 
Hargus, 840 F.3d at 136. 
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 As Bocchino concedes, the location aspect of the 
jurisdictional test is satisfied because the alleged tort occurred 
on the Delaware River. Bocchino also concedes that the second 
part of the connection test is satisfied, because carrying 
passengers for hire on a vessel on navigable waters is 
substantially related to traditional maritime activity. Thus, our 
analysis of whether there is admiralty jurisdiction in this case 
is focused on the first part of the connection test: an assessment 
of the general features of the incident, and whether such an 
incident has the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. 
 The United States Supreme Court has instructed courts 
to “assess the general features of the type of incident involved 
to determine whether such an incident is likely to disrupt 
commercial activity.” Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363. Such an 
assessment “turns . . . on a description of the incident at an 
intermediate level of possible generality.” Jerome B. Grubart, 
Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 538 
(1995). As discussed in our decision in Hargus, Sisson and 
Grubart provide illustrative examples of how the specific 
factual details of an incident may be distilled into a description 
of the general character of that incident.   
In Sisson, a fire started in the washer/dryer area of a 
pleasure yacht docked at a marina on Lake Michigan, which 
destroyed the yacht and damaged several other vessels as well 
as the marina. 497 U.S. at 360. For connection test purposes, 
the Court described the incident as “a fire that began on a 
noncommercial vessel at a marina located on a navigable 
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waterway.”6 Id. at 362. In Grubart, the Court considered an 
incident where “flooding [of basements in downtown Chicago 
allegedly] resulted from events several months earlier, when . 
. . Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Company had used a crane, 
sitting on a barge in the river next to a bridge, to drive piles 
into the riverbed above the tunnel.” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 529. 
There, the Court described the incident as “damage by a vessel 
in navigable water to an underwater structure.” Id. at 539.  
Our own maritime tort jurisprudence is also instructive 
when crafting “general features” descriptions for purposes of 
applying the connection test to a particular set of facts. For 
example, in Neely v. Club Med Management Services, Inc., we 
considered a scenario where a scuba-diving instructor and 
vessel crewmember was injured after being hit by a dive boat’s 
propellers while she was out with resort patrons. 63 F.3d 166, 
170 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc). The description we chose for 
purposes of determining jurisdiction was “damage by a vessel 
in navigable water to [a seaman].” Id. at 179 (alteration in 
original). Most recently, in Hargus, we were presented with a 
case where the captain of the vessel One Love threw an empty 
insulated coffee cup from the beach that hit a passenger 
standing on the One Love, which at the time was anchored in 
knee-deep water approximately twenty-five feet away. 
Hargus, 840 F.3d at 134–35. We described that activity as 
“throwing a small inert object from land at an individual 
onboard an anchored vessel.” Id. at 137. 
                                                 
6 In a subsequent case, the Court referred to the incident 
in Sisson as “the burning of docked boats at a marina on 
navigable waters.” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 533–34. 
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 In formulating a general features description in this 
case, we are mindful of the Supreme Court’s caution to avoid 
descriptions that are “too general” such that they cannot be 
useful in comparing cases, or descriptions that are overly 
specific such that they would ignore an incident’s capacity to 
have an effect on maritime commerce. See Grubart, 513 U.S. 
at 538–39 (discussing the incident in Sisson and observing that 
“[t]o speak of the incident as ‘fire’ would have been too general 
to differentiate cases; at the other extreme, to have described 
the fire as damaging nothing but pleasure boats and their tie-
up facilities would have ignored, among other things, the 
capacity of pleasure boats to endanger commercial shipping 
that happened to be nearby.”). Rather, we must look at the facts 
of this case and formulate a description that will enable us to 
determine “whether the incident could be seen within a class 
of incidents that posed more than a fanciful risk to commercial 
shipping.” Id. at 539. Applying these principles, we hold that 
the incident at issue here is best described as “an altercation 
between passengers on a boat in the process of docking.” 7 
                                                 
7 Taking the disputed and undisputed facts into account, 
the District Court concluded that “the fight, if one occurred, 
erupted toward the end of the cruise.” App. 9a–10a. The degree 
to which the Ben Franklin Yacht had completed docking was 
unclear as a result of conflicting deposition testimony from 
crewmembers and the claimants. The District Court 
specifically noted the following factual disputes: whether the 
vessel was docking or docked when the altercation occurred; 
the magnitude of the altercation and the total number of 
passengers involved, which was allegedly as many as forty to 
forty-five passengers; whether and when members of the crew 
became involved in resolving the altercation; and whether 
passengers left the vessel on their own or with the assistance of 
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Describing the incident this way captures the general nature of 
the tort and its attendant circumstances without being too 
generic or too specific.8 Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538–39.   
                                                 
the vessel’s employees and crew. Thus, although it is not 
possible to ascertain the location of the vessel relative to the 
pier on the summary judgment record before us, such a precise 
determination is unnecessary to resolve the question of subject 
matter jurisdiction. For purposes of crafting a general features 
description to which the connection test may be applied, we 
need only state that the vessel was “in the process of docking” 
while the altercation was occurring.   
8 After reviewing and comparing the witnesses’ 
recollections and setting forth the parties’ respective versions 
of the disputed facts based on the summary judgment record, 
the District Court concluded that the incident “should be 
described as something like a physical altercation among 
recreational passengers on board a vessel that is in the 
immediate process of docking.” App. 23a. We respectfully 
disagree with the District Court’s formulation of a general 
features description, as it is too specific in the following three 
ways: first, a verbal altercation arising at an inopportune time 
could be as distracting to the crew as a physical altercation; 
second, the fact that the passengers are “recreational” is not a 
determinative factor for admiralty jurisdiction, so long as the 
activity underlying the incident has a “substantial relationship 
to a ‘traditional maritime activity,’” Sisson, 497 U.S. at 365; 
and third, the “immediacy” of the Ben Franklin Yacht’s 
docking at the time the altercation started is not clear from the 
record. For these reasons, we have chosen the slightly more 
generalized description set forth above. 
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Having crafted our description of the general features of 
the incident in this case, we must now “ascertain ‘whether the 
incident could be seen within a class of incidents that posed 
more than a fanciful risk to commercial shipping.’” Hargus, 
840 F.3d at 136 (quoting Grubart, 513 U.S. at 539). We turn 
to the first prong of the connection test, which “requires us to 
assess the ‘potential’ disruptive effects that the type of incident 
involved could have on maritime commerce, not whether the 
particular incident at hand actually disrupted maritime 
commerce.” Id. at 136 (quoting Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538–39). 
A brief review of our discussion in Hargus illustrates the type 
of factors to consider when assessing an incident’s potential to 
disrupt maritime commerce.  
In Hargus, we discussed Tandon v. Captain’s Cove 
Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., a Second Circuit case which 
involved an injury to passengers that did not have the potential 
to disrupt maritime commerce. Hargus, 840 F.3d at 137 (citing 
Tandon, 752 F.3d 239, 249 (2d Cir. 2014)). The Second Circuit 
described the general features of the incident as “a physical 
altercation among recreational visitors on and around a 
permanent dock surrounded by navigable water.” Tandon, 752 
F.3d at 249. The court found that the incident did not have the 
potential to disrupt maritime commerce because it 
“threaten[ed] only its participants,” could not “create any 
obstruction to the free passage of commercial ships along 
navigable waterways” or “lead to a disruption in the course of 
the waterway itself,” and could not “immediately damage 
nearby commercial vessels.” Id. In addition, because the 
incident did not occur at sea, it “could not ‘distract the crew 
from their duties, endangering the safety of the vessel and 
risking collision with others on the same waterway,’” nor could 
it “force the vessel ‘to divert from its course to obtain medical 
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care for the injured person,’” who “was not ‘employed in 
maritime commerce.’” Hargus, 840 F.3d at 137 (quoting 
Tandon, 752 F.3d at 250). The Second Circuit was careful to 
note that “the class of incidents we consider here includes only 
fights on permanent docks . . . . This type of incident does not 
pose the same risks to maritime commerce as a fistfight 
occurring on a vessel on navigable water.” Tandon, 752 F.3d 
at 250. This was so, in part because “[a] fight on a vessel may 
distract the crew from their duties, endangering the safety of 
the vessel and risking collision with others on the same 
waterway.” Id.   
Similar assessments in this case lead us to conclude that 
an altercation between passengers on a boat in the process of 
docking has the potential to disrupt maritime commerce. 
Although the record is unclear about the location of the vessel 
when the fight broke out, how many people were involved in 
the fight, and the crew’s involvement, if any, in stopping the 
fight, there are numerous scenarios that could result from a 
passenger altercation, each of which poses more than a fanciful 
risk to maritime commerce. First, this type of incident has the 
potential to distract the captain or crew during the docking 
procedure, which could have resulted in the vessel crashing 
into or in some way colliding with the pier, causing damage to 
the vessel or to the pier. Depending on the degree of damage 
to the pier, it could be rendered unusable. Second, a mishap 
during docking also has the potential to cause injuries to 
passengers or the crew, the latter of which could leave the 
vessel unable to dock at the pier. Such injuries could require a 
rescue of those on board, which might then lead to a Coast 
Guard investigation. Finally, if the crew was sufficiently 
sidetracked by the altercation and unable to execute the 
docking maneuver, the vessel could be forced back out on the 
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waterway with a veritable riot among the passengers. That 
would certainly be distracting to the captain and crew, and also 
pose a risk to nearby vessels. Any of these outcomes were 
possible, and all have the potential to disrupt maritime 
commerce. 
Bocchino’s argument to the contrary is not persuasive. 
He asserts that, due to the nature of the finger pier where the 
Ben Franklin Yacht docks, the vessel was not in open waters 
during the altercation, and thus could not encounter other 
vessels or block their navigation, cause a disruption on the 
waterway, or cause any immediate damage to other vessels 
while docking because it was in an isolated location. This 
argument has two flaws.  First, it depends in part on the overly-
specific “general features” description Bocchino proposes, 
which characterizes Pier 24 as an “isolated location.” Bocchino 
Br. 18 n.4. Second, it focuses on what did not actually happen 
to the Ben Franklin Yacht as a result of the altercation taking 
place while the vessel was in the process of docking, rather 
than what could have happened. As previously stated, the 
connection test requires us to “assess the ‘potential’ disruptive 
effects that the type of incident involved could have on 
maritime commerce, not whether the particular incident at 
hand actually disrupted maritime commerce.” Hargus, 840 
F.3d at 136 (emphases added) (citing Grubart, 513 U.S. at 
538–39); see also Tandon, 752 F.3d at 252 n.8 (noting that, to 
the extent that the parties arguing in favor of maritime 
jurisdiction rested their argument “on specific aspects of the 
incident that actually occurred, [that argument] clearly fails, 
because our analysis looks only to the general type of incident 
at issue rather than particular facts about that incident.”) (citing 
Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538). Had the altercation distracted the 
crew or required their intervention during the docking 
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process—two very real possibilities—any damage to the vessel 
or the pier that may have resulted could easily have caused a 
disruption to maritime commerce.9 Hence, our conclusion that 
the first prong of the connection test is met. As the other 
aspects of the location and connection tests are satisfied, we 
therefore hold that admiralty jurisdiction is appropriate in this 
case.  
*  *  * 
For the reasons stated, we will reverse the judgment of 
the District Court and vacate its dismissal of the limitation 
action. This case is remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
                                                 
9 We respectfully disagree with the District Court’s 
assessment that, based on its view that the Ben Franklin Yacht 
was in the immediate process of docking when the altercation 
started, the risk of disrupting maritime commerce was merely 
fanciful. The general features of this type of incident, which 
are what we must consider for purposes of determining 
jurisdiction, demonstrate that there is a potential for an 
altercation between passengers on a boat in the process of 
docking to disrupt maritime commerce, and that the potential 
for disruption to maritime commerce is more than fanciful.   
